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Abstract
The global nancial crisis of late 2008 could not have provided more con-
vincing evidence that price stability is not a su¢ cient condition for nancial
stability. In order to attain both, central banks must develop macropruden-
tial instruments in order to prevent the occurrence of systemic risk episodes.
For this reason testing the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent macroprudential tools and
their interaction with monetary policy is crucial. In this paper we explore
whether two policy instruments, namely, a capital adequacy ratio (CAR)
rule in combination with a Taylor rule may provide a better macroeconomic
outcome than a Taylor rule alone. We conduct our analysis by appending
a macroeconometric nancial block to an otherwise standard semistructural
small open economy neokeynesian model for policy analysis estimated for the
Mexican economy. Our results show that with the inclusion of the second
policy instrument the central bank can obtain substantial gains. Moreover,
we nd that when the CAR rule is adequately designed the central authority
can mitigate output gap shocks of twice the variance than the Taylor rule
alone scenario. Thus, under this two rule case the central authority can iso-
late nancial shocks and dampen their e¤ects over macroeconomic variables.
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Vera and participants of the Financial Stability Course at the Centre for Central Banking
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views and conclusions presented here are exclusively the responsibility of the author and
does not necessarily reect those of Banco de México.
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...the experience of nancial crisis, panic in September 2008
to March 2009, and nearly widespread collapse, has been so un-
nerving and shaking that there is likely to be far-reaching changes
to the operation and regulation/supervision of the nancial sys-
tem in general, and to the role and functions of the Central Bank
in particular... [Charles A.E. Goodhart, The Changing Role of
Central Banks]
1 Introduction
The global nancial crisis of late 2008 could not have provided more con-
vincing evidence that price stability is not a su¢ cient condition for nancial
stability. In order to avoid the collapse of the nancial system central banks
around the globe instrumented exceptional policies, some of them with long
lasting e¤ects and lessons.1 In these circumstances, central banks started a
quest to redene themselves in an environment in which price and nancial
stability must be pursued.
In this context, nancial sector and banking regulatory bodies at domestic
and international level strengthened regulatory standards aimed at making
the nancial sector more resilient. An example of this type of strengthen-
ing is Basel III whose main features are described in Caruana (2010). De-
spite this e¤ort, the challenge of designing a richer array of policy tools to
be implemented by nancial authorities for macroprudential purposes still
remains. As Galati and Moessner (2011) points out, this process mostly in-
volves testing the e¤ectiveness of macroprudential tools and exploring their
coordination with monetary policy.
This topic is of great importance to central banks for a bunch of reasons.
As Baily, Campbell, Cochrane, Diamond, Du¢ e, French, Kashyap, Mishkin,
Rajan, and Shiller (2010) argues, the central bank is a natural choice as a sys-
temic regulator based on four reasons: 1) given his daily trading relationship
with market participants it is well placed to monitor problems in the nan-
cial system, 2) the objective of macroeconomic stability ts together with
ensuring the stability of the nancial system, 3) central banks are among
the most independent government agencies, and 4) central banks are lenders
of last resort. Thus, following the above article, in the present paper we
assume that rules, including those to preserve nancial stability, are set by
the central bank.2
1See Borio and Disyatat (2010) for an excellent review of unconventional measures
implemented by several central banks during the crisis.
2Cecchetti, Gyntelberg, and Hollanders (2009) and Angelini, Neri, and Panetta (2010)
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The purpose of this paper is to explore whether two policy instruments,
namely, a capital adequacy ratio rule ("CAR rule" from here on) in combi-
nation with a conventional Taylor rule may provide a better outcome than a
Taylor rule alone from a macroeconomic point of view. In other words, the
scope of this paper is to shed some light on the advantages and drawbacks
of adding a CAR rule to the traditional monetary policy instrument. Never-
theless, given Basel requirements for capital to asset ratios, we should think
of a CAR rule as an instrument for setting "bu¤ers" of capital requirements
that banks within a jurisdiction must comply with over time. That is, in
this paper we assume that at all times, regardless of the adjustments that
nancial authorities make to capital requirements, these exhibit levels above
those required by Basel.
Given the lack of a "canonical model" to study the connection between
nancial and real variables,3 while the profession works on the microfounda-
tions of real and nancial linkages, for the moment we take a shortcut and
append a macroeconometric nancial block to an otherwise standard semi-
structural small open economy neokeynesian model ("core" model) for policy
analysis.4
The macroeconometric nancial block is essentially a set of "reduced
form" equations that allows us to bring into the analysis lending spreads,
delinquency indexes and credit volumes (all these variables by sector: non-
nancial corporations, consumption and mortgages) to make them inter-
act with the core model.5 Like part of the work done by Macroeconomic-
Assessment-Group (2010a), the channel in which the nancial block impacts
the core model is through the e¤ect of lending spreads on the output gap.6
Specically, an increase in the lending spreads slows down economic activ-
argue that coordination between monetary and macroprudential policies achieves better
results. We get around coordination problems in this paper by assuming that both policies
are implemented by the central bank.
3Several attempts in this line are Curdia and Woodford (2010a), Curdia and Woodford
(2010b), Gertler and Karadi (2009), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Dib (2010) and Meh
and Moran (2010).
4Among the features of this small open economy neokeynesian model is the fact that
some of the structural equations are of hybrid type, that is, with backward and forward
looking elements and agents are assumed to have rational expectations.
5See Barrell and Gottschalk (2006) for a macroeconometric block which also contains
some nancial variables.
6Notice that alternatively, the e¤ect from the nancial sector as represented by the
nancial block to the core model could have been through credit volumes or lending
stardards. Nevertheless, preeliminary evidence for the case of Mexico presented in Banxico
(2010) points out that credit volume does not Granger cause the output gap. For the case
of Mexico, lending standards are available for a very short period of time. Hence, statistical
inference is highly unprecise.
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ity. This may be so since higher lending spreads tend to reduce spending by
households and entreprises, reducing aggregate consumption and investment
mainly in the short run. However, unlike in most of the models used in the
previous study, we allow for feedback e¤ects from the core model to the nan-
cial sector and the other way around as the core model and the nancial block
are integrated in this work.7 In other words, shocks that hit variables in the
nancial block end up having an e¤ect on the core model, which in turn feed-
back on nancial variables and so on. The same is true for a shock that hits
a variable in the core model. Given that we model equations with banking
sector wide variables, this work attempts to contribute towards addressing
the time-series dimension of nancial stability rather than the cross-sectional
dimension.8
This approach makes it possible to analyze the interaction of di¤erent
policy instruments. In particular, we evaluate the performance of Taylor
rules and CAR rules from a macroeconomic perspective. Our results show
that with the inclusion of the second policy instrument the central bank
can obtain substantial gains. Specically, ination and output volatility are
greatly reduced without putting too much stress on the nancial sector (mea-
sured by its variance).This is best achieved when macroprudential responses
to nancial sector distress do not o¤set traditional monetary policy at the
macroeconomic level. In other words, an appropriate macroprudential policy
tool should reinforce the stabilizing e¤ect of monetary policy over output and
ination by isolating macroeconomic variables from nancial sector shocks.
At this point it is useful to review some of the work in the literature
close to the present one. An article which falls within this line is Angeloni
and Faia (2009).9 They nd that a restrictive monetary policy leads to an
increase in bankscapital ratio. This happens because a rise in the interest
7To the best of our knowledge, no stress test model that is capable of analyzing variables
across banks is capable of feeding back the e¤ects of the nancial system to the macro-
economy. These models, although very rich in the processes that occur across banks, do
not yet capture e¤ects from the nancial system to the macroeconomy. A state-of-the-
art model in this category is the RAMSI model developed at the Bank of England (see
Aikman, Alessandri, Eklund, Gai, Kapadia, Martin, Mora, Sterne, and Willison (2009)).
8See Galati and Moessner (2011) for this important distinction in the literature of
macroprudential policy tools.
9Their article incorporates banks into a standard DSGE model to study their role
in the transmission of shocks and determine what policy rules are optimal if a central
bank wishes to consider nancial stability as well as macroeconomic stability. This allows
them to conduct some experiments of interest. One is to see the e¤ect of an interest
rate shock on banksendogenous capital structure. Banks are modeled as intermediaries
between entrepreneurs and households and bank capitalists which interact in a perfectly
competitive nancial market; this makes them vulnerable to runs.
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rate (which is paid on householdsdeposits) increases the probability of a
run on the banks, given the independent return on entrepreneursinvestment
projects. Banks nd it optimal to o¤set this risk by increasing their capital
ratio. Furthermore, they determine whether it is optimal to set a pro-cyclical,
counter-cyclical or xed capital regime if the central authority wishes to
use banks capital ratio as a policy instrument. Therefore, they contrast
three di¤erent regimes in which two policy instruments interact. In all cases,
the capital ratio only responds to deviations of the output from its steady
state value. They nd that counter-cyclical rules dampen the business cycles
whereas pro-cyclical regimes accentuate shocks. Banking sector risk is more
stable under the xed capital regime.
A similar study is conducted by Covas and Fujita (2009) which contrasts
pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical regulations in capital requirements in a gen-
eral equilibrium framework where banks participate in the economy as nan-
cial intermediaries between households and investment projects. Central to
their model is the role of credit in satisfying entrepreneursliquidity needs.
The key phenomenon concerning business cycle dynamics in their framework
is that a productivity shock will be either amplied or dampened depending
on the capital requirements regime. This is so because capital requirements
directly inuence loans and entrepreneursliquidity dependence, thus a¤ect-
ing investment. They nd that output volatility is almost 26% higher under
pro-cyclical regulation compared to an anti-cyclical case.
More closely related studies would be Angelini, Neri, and Panetta (2010)
and Denis, Clerc, and Mojon (2011). Both use general equilibrium models
to explore di¤erent forms of macroprudential policies. They both nd that
introducing a new policy rule in coordination with the usual monetary rule
helps in reducing the variance of output and ination. Moreover, in line
with our results, Denis, Clerc, and Mojon (2011) nds that the second policy
instrument works by shielding macroeconomic variables from nancial sector
shocks. In contrast with our work, they use the loan to value ratio as their
additional policy instrument.
Although our results contribute to the debate on the design of macro-
prudential instruments and their macroeconomic assessment it is important
to remark that further research is crucial to develop a fully microfounded
workhorse model to analyze the type of issues addressed in this paper.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model, section 3 presents the data used, section 4 shows some policy experi-
ments and section 5 concludes.
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2 The Model
Several attempts have been recently made in the literature to introduce mod-
els with nancial intermediation. Nevertheless, at the moment there is not
yet a "canonical" model to study the relationship between banks capital-
ization, nancial intermediation and economic activity. Moreover, as Galati
and Moessner (2011) points out "both theoretical and empirical work link-
ing the nancial sector to the macroeconomy is far from a stage where it
can be operationalized and used for risk analysis and policy simulations".
Hence, a lot of research is expected to emerge in this line within the fol-
lowing years. Nonetheless, for the moment we take a shortcut appending a
macroeconometric nancial block to a standard semistructural small open
economy neokeynesian model. Thus, our model consist of two main parts.
2.1 The Core Model
The core model is a standard semi-structural small open economy neokeyne-
sian model.10 In other words, the coe¢ cients of the equations of this model
are of reduced form although the specication of the equations have a solid
theoretical background.11 In principle this sort of model incorporates a mini-
mum set of variables that allow us, among other things, to study the response
of the monetary authority to shocks that hit the economy. The classical cases
are "cost-push" shocks and demand shocks to which the central bank reacts
by changing its policy rate.
The components of the core model are:12
1. A Phillips curve for wage ination.13
2. Equations for ination sub-indexes.
3. An IS curve for the output gap.
4. An equation for real exchange rate.14
10See for instance Freedman, Johnson, Kriljenko, Ivan, Garcia-Saltos, and Laxton
(2009).
11See Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and Smets and Wouters (2003).
12The core model is very similar in terms of equations and coecients to those in Sidaoui
and Ramos-Francia (2008). We rewrite the equations in Appendix C.
13For further reference, see Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000).
14Uncovered interest rate parity.
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5. A monetary policy rule (Taylor rule) which in this paper takes the
following form:
it = f1it 1 + (1  f1)[f0 + f2xt + f3(t   )] (1)
where it is the nominal interest rate, xt denotes output gap, t is the
annual ination rate and  is the central banks ination target; thus, the
term (t   ) is the ination gap.
Although this model has been useful for guiding central bankers to set
policy interest rates, it lacks a richer set of nancial variables to which the
nancial stability authority, which in this paper we assume is the central
bank, may need to react for macroprudential purposes. With the idea of
setting a simple framework in which nancial variables are of potential con-
sideration for the reaction function of the monetary authority, we next lay
down a small-scale macroeconometric nancial block.
2.2 The Financial Block
In this block lending spreads are dependent on banksdelinquency indexes
and capital. The idea here is that banks increase their lending spreads when
they face higher delinquency indexes (so as to o¤set higher potential losses)
and when they hold more capital as a share of risk weighted assets (so as to
keep their return on equity, ROE, roughly constant besides adjustments in
capital requirements). Delinquency indexes are modeled as function of their
lagged values and the output gap, being the relationship between delinquency
indexes and the output gap negative. That is, when the output gap expands
(reduces) delinquency indexes fall (increase). This is the channel that allows
for feedback from the core model to the nancial block. Additionally, credit
volume responds positively to changes in the output gap and negatively to
lending spreads.
Admittedly, the nancial block is a "reduced-form" specication and
should not be considered a substitute for a model with deep parameters.
This shortcut, however, allows us to obtain optimal macroprudential instru-
ments a central bank may need to set in order to procure nancial stability
along with macroeconomic stability. In particular, this framework lets us
conduct a few exercises that may be helpful for guiding the discussion of
whether central banks could attain lower social losses (to be dened later)
by using a second policy instrument, namely, a CAR rule in combination
with a Taylor rule, rather than the latter instrument alone. Moreover, this
framework is helpful in exploring some characteristics of the business cycles
under the two sets of proposed policy instruments.
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The nancial block consists of a set of estimated equations that interact
with each other and with the core model. This block has the following
components:
1. A modied IS equation to include lending spreads.15
2. Equations for lending spreads by sector.
3. Equations for delinquency indexes by sector.
4. Equations for a "credit gap" by sector.
5. A rulefor the capital adequacy ratio.
The sectors that are considered are credit to non-nancial corporations,
credit to consumers and credit for mortgages. In the following subsections,
we describe in detail the components of the nancial block. The estimation
is presented in Appendix A.
2.2.1 A Modied IS Equation
The channel in which the nancial block impacts the core model is through
the e¤ect of lending spreads on the output gap. This mechanism is in line
with some of the work done in Macroeconomic-Assessment-Group (2010a).
For this reason an additional argument is incorporated into the otherwise
standard IS curve for a small open economy. Such an argument is the lending
spread.16 Hence, we propose the following IS specication:
xt = b0+b1xt 1+b2Etxt+1+b3rt 1+b4xUSt 1+b5 ln(rert)+b6spreadt+"x;t (2)
where xt is the output gap, rt is the real interest rate, xUSt is the output
gap in the United States, rert is the bilateral real exchange between the
United States and Mexico17, spreadt is the weighted lending spread, Et[] is
the expectation operator with information at time t and ln() is the natural
logarithm. The term "x;t is an i.i.d. disturbance with zero mean and variance
"x : In line with the Macroeconomic-Assessment-Group (2010a), we expect
an increase in the lending spread to have a negative e¤ect on the output gap,
15As mentioned above, an increase in lending spreads has a negative e¤ect on economic
activity.
16This variable is the overall lending spread of the three credit sectors analyzed in this
paper. Thus, weights are calculated according to the net credit to each one of these three
sectors.
17When the variable rer increases, we say that the real exchange rate of Mexico dep-
preciates.
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thus b6 must be negative.18 In other words, when the lending spread increases
economic activity slows down. This may be so since higher lending spreads
tend to reduce spending by households and entreprises, reducing aggregate
consumption and investment mainly in the short run. Moreover, the main
impact would tend to fall on bank-dependent sectors: households and small
and medium-sized enterprises as they most likely lack other form of nancial
intermediaries apart from banks.
2.2.2 Equations for Lending Spreads by Sector
This component of the nancial block is comprised by equations that trans-
late levels of sector specic delinquency indexes and a banking system capital
adequacy ratio (regulatory capital/risk weighted assets) into sectorial lending
spreads.
The idea behind these reduced form equations is that commercial banks
increase lending rates when facing higher potential losses in the future and
when they hold more regulatory capital as a share of their risk weighted
assets. An assumption behind the previous specications is that commer-
cial banks keep their ROE roughly invariant to changes in potential losses
they face and to the composition of their portfolio and bank capitalization
which in turn a¤ect the capital adequacy ratio. Thus, we have the following
specication:
spreadjt = 
j
0 + 
j
1spread
j
t 1 + 
j
2delin
j
t + 
j
3CARt + "spreadj ;t (3)
for j = fcorp; cons;mortg; where corp; cons and mort stand for credit
to non-nancial corporations, to consumers and for mortgages respectively;
moreover, delinjt is the delinquency index in sector j and CARt is the capital
adequacy ratio of the banking system. In line with the above arguments we
expect j2,
j
3 > 0 for all j: To capture the possible correlation between sectors
we model the vector of disturbances ("spreadcorp;t; "spreadcons;t; "spreadmort;t)0 as
i.i.d. with zero mean and variance-covariance matrix spread.
2.2.3 Equations for Delinquency Indexes by Sector
Next we present specications for delinquency indexes by sector. For this
component of the nancial block we have the following specication:
delinjt = '
j
0 + '
j
1delin
j
t 1 + '
j
2xt + "delinj ;t (4)
18Notice that when b6 = 0; the core model does keep a¤ecting the nancial block but
the latter no longer feedbacks to the former.
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for j = fcorp; cons;mortg; and the vectors ("delincorp;t; "delincons;t; "delinmort;t)0
are i.i.d. disturbances with zero mean and variance-covariance matrix delin.
The idea behind the previous specication is that episodes of economic activ-
ity expansion come along with decreases in the level of delinquency indexes
('j2 < 0 for all j) as debtors default less. As mentioned before the impact
from the output gap to delinquency indexes is key in this model to make the
nancial block and the core model interdependent.
2.2.4 Equations for the Credit Gap by Sector
This component of the nancial block is comprised by the following specication:
crjt = 
j
0 + 
j
1cr
j
t 1 + 
j
2spread
j
t + 
j
3xt + "crj ;t (5)
for j = fcorp; cons;mortg; where crjt is the credit gap (to be explained
below) of sector j; and the vectors ("crcorp;t; "crcons;t; "crmort;t)0 are i.i.d. distur-
bances with zero mean and variance-covariance matrix cr. This specication
is basically a demand for credit of each type. Thus, higher lending spreads
reduce the credit gap and a higher output gap comes along with a higher
credit gap.19
2.2.5 Identities
Finally, a few identities are needed to complete the nancial block.
spreadt  wcorpspreadcorpt + wconsspreadconst + wmortspreadmortt (6)
crt  wcorpcrcorpt + wconscrconst + wmortcrmortt (7)
delint  corpdelincorpt + consdelinconst + mortdelinmortt (8)
where wj and j for j = fcorp; cons;mortg are weights. The former set
of weights are calculated according to the share of credit of each type; the
second set are calculated by OLS.
19It is important to remark that the structure of the model so far places sectorial credit
gaps as residual variables. The only case when they are no longer residual is when they
are argument of the reaction functions of the monetary authority.
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2.2.6 Capital Adequacy Ratio Rules
In this section we present two specications that the capital adequacy ratio
may take.
Baseline Capital Adequacy Ratio Equation This specication has the
form:
CARt = 0 + 1CARt 1 + "CAR;t (9)
where "CAR;t are i.i.d. disturbances with zero mean and variance "CAR :
Notice that this specication attempts to capture in the simplest possible way
the evolution of commercial banks(at an aggregate level) capital adequacy
ratios. In one of our specications, the case of the Taylor rule alone, this
would be the equation modelling the capital adequacy ratio since it is not an
instrument of the central bank.
Central Bank Capital Adequacy Ratio Rule According to specica-
tion (9), this variable is exogenous for the monetary authority.20 Nonetheless,
one may think of this variable as an additional instrument used by the mon-
etary authority to attain macroeconomic and macroprudential objectives. In
this setting the authority would be in a position to impose a level for the
capital to asset ratio for the banking system.21 As a rst step we propose
a specication that combines the baseline capital equation (expression (9))
and the rule set by the monetary authority. The latter specication takes
the form:
CARt = 0 + 1CARt 1 + CARRt + "CAR;t (10)
where CARRt stands for the CAR rule required by the central bank in addi-
tion to the level of this variable determined by its baseline equation. For the
CAR rule followed by the central bank, CARRt ; we propose the functional
form:
CARRt = 0 + 1CARt 1 + 2zt (11)
20We assume that this variable is always above a minimum level set by the prevailing
Basel agreement.
21Notice that in our setting we assume, for mathematical tractability, that the central
bank sets a level for this variable rather than a minimum. One way banks could adjust
this ratio, at least in the short run, could be by changing their risk prole so as to change
the value of their risk weighted assets.
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where zt is a variable according to which the monetary authority sets banking
system capital adequacy ratio.
Notice that if we substitute (11) into (10) we obtain:
CARt = ~0 + ~1CARt 1 + ~2zt + "CAR;t (12)
where ~0  0 + 0; ~1  1 + 1; ~2  2: Anticipating the exercises of
section, 4.1, zt will be set equal to xt; crt; and spreadt: That is, we will
explore the performance of the CAR rule when the monetary authority sets
this rule optimally, in addition to an optimal Taylor rule, as a function of the
output gap, the credit gap and the lending spreads respectively. The notion
of optimality that we employ will also be discussed in section 4.1.
3 The Data
In this section we describe the data set of the nancial block. In total we
have the following variables: lending spreads by sector, delinquency indexes
by sector, credit volumes by sector and a measure of capital adequacy ratio.
Recall that the sectors included in this analysis are credit to non-nancial
corporations, credit to consumers and credit for mortgages.22 Our sample
ranges from the rst quarter of 2003 to the third quarter of 2010.
Lending spreads are constructed as the di¤erence between the aggregate
implicit lending rate by sector and the average cost of bank term deposits.23
Delinquency indexes by sector are the "IMORA" indexes (adjusted delin-
quency indexes), which are the sum of overdue loans and loans written-o¤ in
the prior twelve months divided by total loans plus loans written-o¤ in the
last twelve months. The credit variable considered is the cycle component,
or credit gap, of the credit volume by sector. Finally, the capital adequacy
ratio measure is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets. The source
of all data is Banco de México.
Table 1 shows summary statistics of the data set. Although most of the
data has a monthly frequency, we have transformed it into quarterly data
since such is the frequency of the variables of the core model.
In Table 1 we can see that the average lending spreads of credit to con-
sumers is several times higher than the average lending spread of credit to
22From the total credit comprised by these three sectors, the shares of credit to con-
sumption, mortgages and corporations are 24.77%, 20.85% and 54.38% respectively.
23Data on "spot" lending rates is not available. Hence, we use implicit interest rates
which are obtained as the revenue from loans to sector j divided by the assets of that
sector in the banking system.
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non-nancial corporations and mortgages, being the lending spread to non-
nancial corporations the lowest. Although levels are quite di¤erent, the
standard deviation of these lending spreads is quite similar. Moreover, it
is important to notice that all lending spreads are countercyclical. That is,
periods in which the output gap is expanding, lending spreads are falling.
This fact is seen in the column "Correlation with output gap" of Table 1.
Regarding delinquency indexes, it is important to remark that credit to
consumption is the highest whereas credit to non-nancial corporations is the
lowest. The standard deviation varies considerably across credit sectors. Fur-
thermore, delinquency indexes are countercyclical. In other words, episodes
of output expansion come along with a decrease in delinquency indexes.
With respect to credit gaps we observe that on average the one corre-
sponding to credit to consumption is the highest whereas the corresponding
to non-nancial corporations is the lowest. Also, notice that these variables
exhibit considerable variance as seen in the standard deviation and in the
minimum and maximum values. From Table 1, we also observe that the
total credit gap as well as sectorial ones are procyclical.
Finally, notice that the average capital adequacy ratio is quite high through-
out this period and exhibits moderate variability. As it will be seen later,
this characteristic of the capital adequacy ratio brings up important consid-
erations regarding the use of this variable as a policy instrument.
4 Numerical Exercises
In this section we rst perform a macroeconomic evaluation of Taylor rules
in combination with several specications of a capital adequacy ratio as a
policy instrument. As a benchmark to compare we also evaluate a Taylor
rule alone. Next we show some impulse-response functions to illustrate the
functioning of the model under alternative policy instruments.
4.1 Macroeconomic Evaluation of Policy Instruments
In this subsection we use the model described above to evaluate from a macro-
economic point of view a few combinations of policy instruments. To perform
this evaluation we follow the traditional approach of setting a "loss function"
to rank di¤erent combination of rules. In particular we are interested in eval-
uating whether two optimal policy instruments, namely, an optimal Taylor
rule in combination with an optimal CAR rule (jointly optimized) achieve a
better outcome than an optimal Taylor rule alone.24 Thus, these exercises
24The notion of optimallity will be made explicit latter in the text.
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shed some light on the advantages and drawbacks of adding a CAR rule to a
traditional Taylor rule in a model economy in which the nancial sector is also
a source of shocks. Moreover, this setting is useful to study the interaction
between the traditional monetary policy instrument with a macroprudential
one.
The evaluation is done for four specications of "simple" instruments:25
 Case 1: An optimal Taylor Rule.
 Case 2a: An optimal Taylor Rule and an optimal CAR rule that re-
sponds to the output gap, i.e. zt = xt in expression (12).
 Case 2b: An optimal Taylor Rule and an optimal CAR rule that re-
sponds to the credit gap, i.e. zt = crt in expression (12).
 Case 2c: An optimal Taylor Rule and an optimal CAR rule that re-
sponds to lending spreads, i.e. zt = spreadt in expression (12).
We choose such specications for the following reasons. Case 1 is the
reference case in which the monetary authority operates with a single instru-
ment. Case 2a provides the authority with a second instrument although the
variable to which such an instrument reacts is also one of the arguments of
the Taylor rule. Thus, the CAR rule reaction may be o¤set by the Taylor
rule. In case 2b, we allow the capital adequacy ratio to respond to a nancial
variable, which in this case is the credit gap. This exercise is motivated by
the work of Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2010), which argues that
an important element that Taylor rules should consider is credit expansion
since it can generate sharp increases in asset prices. Nonetheless, as opposed
to their work, we introduce the credit gap as an argument of the CAR rule
and not as an extra argument of the Taylor rule. Finally, in case 2c we intro-
duce lending spreads into the CAR rule since this variable is the one that,
by construction in this model, impacts directly the output gap (see equation
(2)).
To dene a notion of optimality, we propose a loss function very similar
to standard ones in the literature on optimality of Taylor rules. It is in this
25"Simple" refers to the fact that these rules are a function of a small number of vari-
ables. This contrasts with the approach implemented in other algorithms such as those in
Soderlind (1999) in which the optimal rule is a function of all variables in the state vector
of the model. Since the idea here is to shed light on variables to which a central bank may
nd important to react, we focus on simple rules.
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sense that we evaluate from a macroeconomic perspective the performance
of the aforementioned cases. Hence, we dene the loss function, L; as:26
L  2x + 2 + 2i + 2CAR (13)
where 2x is the variance of the output gap, 
2
 is the variance of the ina-
tion gap (annual ination minus ination target), 2i is the variance of the
changes in the policy interest rate and 2CAR is the variance of the changes
in the capital adequacy ratio. These variances correspond to the ones of
the invariant distribution of the model. Notice that we have assigned the
same weight to output, ination gap variance and to the corresponding to
2i. However, the weight assigned to 
2
CAR is di¤erent; this is so since for
a tested case in which this coe¢ cient was set to unity, the capital adequacy
ratio exhibited a very high variance, clearly at odds with the data (see Table
1). Hence, to calibrate the parameter  we match the variance of the capital
adequacy ratio in the model to match the variance of the data. This proce-
dure is presented in detail in Appendix B. The corresponding value of  was
found to be equal to 12.5.
On Table 2 the optimal parameters for the di¤erent rules are presented.27
The rst thing to notice is how similar the coe¢ cients of the Taylor rule
are among all specications, denoting some kind of robustness of the opti-
mal Taylor rule regardless of the specication of the CAR rule.28 Next we
should notice that in case 2a, in which the capital rule responds to the output
gap, the algorithm found that it was optimal to set a countercylical policy,
thus reinforcing what previous works have found (see for instance Goodhart
(2009)). Nevertheless, the obtained coe¢ cient is very small. Notice also that
the reaction of the capital adequacy ratio to the credit gap is almost negligi-
ble; however, this could be explained by the lack of relevance of this variable
in this model as it is a residual variable. Moreover, the rule responding to
lending spreads is the one reacting the most to the additional CAR variable.
Thus, according to the specication of case 2c, when lending spreads increase,
26Other loss functions could be considered. For instance, Angelini, Neri, and Panetta
(2010) consider the variance of the loans to output ratio as one key argument of the loss
function minimized by the macroprudential authority.
27We have used Dynares osr (optimal simple rule) routine to nd the optimal parame-
ters. As in Angelini, Neri, and Panetta (2010) we also found dependence of the optimal
parameters on initial conditions and proceeded by randomly selecting various initial condi-
tions. We sampled 1,000 di¤erent initial conditions for each rule and select the coe¢ cients
which achieve minimum losses.
28For the case in which the nancial block no longer has impact on the core model
(b6 = 0), the coecients of the optimal Taylor rule are f1 = 0:7847, f2 =3.7420 and
f3 =0.9646.
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the CAR rule induces a reduction in the capital to asset ratio in order to o¤-
set the increase in lending spreads which in turn mitigates the shock to the
output gap. In other words, the negative impact on output from an increase
in lending spreads is compensated by a fall in capital requirements so as to
bring down lending spreads.29
4.1.1 SimulationsResults
To assess the performance of the di¤erent cases presented we have simu-
lated stochastic shocks for 1,000 periods letting the optimal rules respond
endogenously. We repeat this procedure 3,000 times and average out across
repetitions for robustness. Results from the simulations are reported in Table
3. There it is clear that when a central bank has two policy instruments at
its disposal it can achieve much better results than with a Taylor rule alone
(case 1).
Our main nding can be seen in the "Loss function" row. On all cases
where the central authority has a second instrument at its disposal the value
of the loss function is close to 12% lower than the corresponding value of case
1. This is accomplished without introducing much more volatility in either
the interest rate or the capital adequacy ratio.30 The intuition behind these
results is that by allowing the central authority to have a second instrument it
can rely less on the interest rate to stabilize the economy. With a Taylor rule
alone the central bank can only respond to shocks in the economy through
adjustments in the interest rate. It must therefore employ it much more
often. As a consequence, the variance of changes in the interest rate31 is
much higher than in cases 2a-2c. By including the capital adequacy ratio
among the central banks policy instruments it can be employed to respond
to shocks originating in the nancial sector. Thus, inuencing the nancial
sector more directly and maintaining the interest rate more stable.
Additionally, it should be noted that the particular interaction between
both policy instruments varies greatly depending on the variable to which
the CAR rule responds. This has important implications for the performance
of each rule. Table 3 shows that while the losses decrease with the inclusion
of a second policy instrument less variance in changes to the interest rate
29Since what it is actually decreasing is the bu¤er of the capital adequacy ratio, we
assume that this fall in bankscapital that comes after a negative shock to the output gap
does not pose a threat to the soundness of the banking system.
30It should be noted that the variance of changes to the capital adequacy ratio does
not account for these results. This is shown in Table E of Appendix D, where we provide
analogous results for a scenario in which no nancial sector shocks occur. Here, the
variance of changes in the capital adequacy ratio is zero for case 1.
31Not reported.
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does not translate automatically into a reduction of the variance of output
and ination gaps. This is explained by the negative correlation between the
interest rate and the capital adequacy ratio, which implies that both policy
instruments are o¤setting each other to a certain extent.32 Whereas, for case
2c the correlation is positive, which indicates that in this case both instru-
ments serve as complements to each other in that they reinforce the policy
e¤ect on output and ination. Thus, the central bank can reduce volatility
in both output and ination with more moderate instrument adjustments.
Case 2c is an important rule in its own right. We found that twice the
variance of the shocks to the output gap would be required to get to the same
value of the loss function attained by case 1. That is, case 2c can dampen
shocks to the output gap twice the size (in terms of variance) of the one
implied by residuals from equation (2).33 By responding to lending spreads,
given the structure of the model economy, the CAR rule reacts to nancial
sector shocks more e¢ ciently as lending spreads are determined only by -
nancial variables. For this same reason it greatly dampens their e¤ect over
macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, in this case nancial variables dis-
play less variance than in the other cases considered. Indeed, for variables
such as the credit gap and lending spreads the di¤erence is very large. So,
what this exercise suggests is that case 2c has the best performance because
(i) it is a rule that has a direct e¤ect on the channel through which nancial
sector shocks are transmitted to main macroeconomic variables, and (ii) re-
sponds to a variable which accurately reects stress in the nancial sector.
These features together account for a large part of the gains observed and
suggest that the overall dynamic is one of isolating nancial shockse¤ect
over macroeconomic variables by e¢ ciently reducing nancial sector volatil-
ity.
In sum, two important insights should be drawn from this exercise. First,
the inclusion of a CAR rule in combination with a Taylor rule allows the
central bank to obtain lower losses from a macroeconomic point of view.
This is so because it helps the central authority stabilize the economy with
much less volatility in changes to the interest rate. Second, the performance
of the di¤erent rules varies greatly depending on how the CAR rule is dened.
The best results are obtained when the CAR rule is such that it is designed as
to complement the interest rate rule. Our results suggest that this is achieved
when the CAR rule responds to nancial variables which accurately reect
distress in the nancial sector while at the same time impacting directly main
32Recall that this variable has a positive e¤ect on lending spreads which in turn pro-
vide the channel through which nancial sector shocks are transmitted to macroeconomic
variables.
33L(2xjcase1)  L(22xjcase2c)
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macroeconomic variables.
4.1.2 Impulse-Response Functions
In this section we present impulse-response functions to illustrate the func-
tioning of the model under all policy alternatives considered.
First we show the response of the economy to a typical headline ination
("cost-push") shock; this is represented in Figure 1. The gure shows that
the interest rate driven by the Taylor rules in all cases respond likewise.
This should not be surprising since according to Table 2 the coe¢ cients of
Taylor rules in all cases are very similar. Moreover, notice that the impact
of the output gap a¤ects the delinquency index which in turn translates into
variations in lending spreads and consequently the credit gap. This is what
drives the di¤erent response of CAR rules to the original "cost-push" shock,
although the e¤ect on the output gap, headline ination and the interest
rate is quite modest. Therefore, although the shock to the core model does
generate e¤ects on the nancial block, these are mild as it is well known
that Taylor rules alone perform well in reaction to "cost-push" and demand
shocks. Consequently, the feedback from the nancial block to the core model
is also moderate and the CAR rules of cases 2a-2c need not play a principal
role in stabilizing macroeconomic variables.
Next we present a less familiar scenario where the source of macroeco-
nomic disturbances is an exogenous shock to the delinquency indexes.34 As
can be seen in Figure 2, this case di¤ers signicantly from the one previously
presented in that CAR rules play a more prominent role. The immediate
e¤ect of the shock is an increase in lending spreads which slows down eco-
nomic activity (creating a fall in the credit gap) and places upward pressure
on ination. Notice that it is by lessening the magnitude of the impact of the
shock on lending spreads that the use of CAR rules (cases 2a-2c) achieve bet-
ter results relative to a Taylor rule alone (case 1). This is because the initial
increase produced by the shock to the delinquency ratio in lending spreads is
partially o¤set by the reduction in the CAR. This e¤ect is almost negligible
in cases 2a and 2b but for the case 2c, this drop is very noteworthy. In such
a case, the fall in lending spreads is very sharp; thus, right after the shock,
the output gap falls by less than what it does in the other cases (case 1 and
cases 2a-2b) which in turn calls for a less abrupt reduction in the interest
rate. However, due to smoothing in the CAR rule, the original reduction in
the CAR of case 2c cannot be undone quickly and thus the economy expe-
riences an increase in the output gap. This in turn leads to an increase in
34The shock is given to the delinquency index of the credit to consumption.
21
0
5
10
15
20
-0
.0
8
-0
.0
6
-0
.0
4
-0
.0
20
0.
02
0.
04
0.
06
0.
080.
1
0.
12
O
ut
pu
t G
ap
Pe
rio
ds
Percentage Points
Ta
yl
or
 R
ul
e
Ta
yl
or
 R
ul
e 
wi
th
 C
AR
 O
ut
pu
t G
ap
 R
ul
e
Ta
yl
or
 R
ul
e 
wi
th
 C
AR
 C
re
di
t G
ap
 R
ul
e
Ta
yl
or
 R
ul
e 
wi
th
 C
AR
 L
en
di
ng
 S
pr
ea
d 
R
ul
e
0
5
10
15
20
0
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
0.
04
0.
05
0.
06
0.
07
0.
08
0.
09
H
ea
dl
in
e 
In
fla
tio
n
Pe
rio
ds
Percentage Points
0
5
10
15
20
0
0.
050.
1
0.
150.
2
0.
250.
3
0.
35
In
te
re
st
 R
at
e
Pe
rio
ds
Percentage Points
0
5
10
15
20
-3-2-101234
x 
10
-4
R
ea
l F
X 
C
ha
ng
e
Pe
rio
ds
Percentage Points
0
5
10
15
20
-0
.0
5
-0
.0
4
-0
.0
3
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
10
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
D
el
in
qu
en
cy
 In
de
x
Pe
rio
ds
Index Units
0
5
10
15
20
-0
.0
4
-0
.0
3
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
10
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
Le
nd
in
g 
Sp
re
ad
Pe
rio
ds
Percentage Points
0
5
10
15
20
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
1
-0
.0
05
0
0.
00
5
0.
01
0.
01
5
0.
02
C
ap
ita
l A
de
qu
ac
y 
R
at
io
Pe
rio
ds
Index Units
0
5
10
15
20
-0
.1
-0
.0
50
0.
050.
1
0.
150.
2
0.
25
C
re
di
t G
ap
Pe
rio
ds
Percentage Points
F
ig
ur
e
1.
Im
pu
ls
e
R
es
po
ns
e
to
a
Sh
oc
k
to
th
e
H
ea
dl
in
e
In
a
ti
on
22
0
5
10
15
20
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
1
-0
.0
05
0
0.
00
5
0.
01
0.
01
5
O
ut
pu
t G
ap
Pe
rio
ds
Percentage Points
Ta
yl
or
 R
ul
e
Ta
yl
or
 R
ul
e 
wi
th
 C
AR
 O
ut
pu
t G
ap
 R
ul
e
Ta
yl
or
 R
ul
e 
wi
th
 C
AR
 C
re
di
t G
ap
 R
ul
e
Ta
yl
or
 R
ul
e 
wi
th
 C
AR
 L
en
di
ng
 S
pr
ea
d 
R
ul
e
0
5
10
15
20
-4-2024681012
x 
10
-4
H
ea
dl
in
e 
In
fla
tio
n
Pe
rio
ds
Percentage Points
0
5
10
15
20
-0
.0
35
-0
.0
3
-0
.0
25
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
1
-0
.0
05
0
0.
00
5
0.
01
0.
01
5
In
te
re
st
 R
at
e
Pe
rio
ds
Percentage Points
0
5
10
15
20
-0
.5
0
0.
51
1.
52
2.
53
3.
54
x 
10
-4
R
ea
l F
X 
C
ha
ng
e
Pe
rio
ds
Percentage Points
0
5
10
15
20
-0
.0
50
0.
050.
1
0.
150.
2
0.
250.
3
0.
35
D
el
in
qu
en
cy
 In
de
x
Pe
rio
ds
Index Units
0
5
10
15
20
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
10
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
0.
04
0.
05
0.
06
0.
07
Le
nd
in
g 
Sp
re
ad
Pe
rio
ds
Percentage Points
0
5
10
15
20
-0
.0
35
-0
.0
3
-0
.0
25
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
1
-0
.0
05
0
0.
00
5
C
ap
ita
l A
de
qu
ac
y 
R
at
io
Pe
rio
ds
Index Units
0
5
10
15
20
-0
.2
-0
.1
5
-0
.1
-0
.0
50
0.
05
C
re
di
t G
ap
Pe
rio
ds
Percentage Points
F
ig
ur
e
2.
Im
pu
ls
e
R
es
po
ns
e
to
a
Sh
oc
k
to
th
e
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Se
ct
or
D
el
in
qu
en
cy
In
de
x
23
the interest rate and the credit gap, which is done while mantaining headline
ination more stable than in the other cases. Notice also that the interest
rate component of case 2c converges much sooner to its steady state value.
So, overall case 2c presents a signicant lower level of the loss function when
reacting to nancial shocks.
The previous ndings show that the reaction of the interest rate compo-
nent amongst cases to a core model shock (here represented by a cost-push
shock) is qualitatively the same. Given that the headline ination and out-
put gap are strongly inuenced by the interest rate, the e¤ect on these two
variables between cases is similar. This implies that when reacting to this
kind of shocks the CAR rule does not add much to stabilizing the economy.
Instead, if the source of macroeconomic disturbances lies in the nancial sec-
tor the CAR component plays an essential role in reducing the impact of the
shock. Thus, the central authority can better accomodate shocks when it
has a second instrument at its disposal.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have appended a macroeconometric nancial block to an
otherwise standard semistructural small open economy neokeynesian model
for policy analysis estimated for the mexican economy to explore whether
two policy instruments, namely, a CAR rule in combination with a Taylor
rule may provide a better outcome than a Taylor rule alone. Our results show
that with the inclusion of the second policy instrument the central bank can
obtain substantial gains from a macroeconomic perspective. Furthermore, we
nd that when the CAR rule is adequately designed the central authority can
achieve a better all around performance. Specically, ination and output
volatility are greatly reduced without putting too much stress on the nancial
sector (measured by its variance).
Even though we believe our approach implies that the structure of the
model reects some of the specic frictions present in the mexican economys
nancial sector we trust that our main ndings may hold for some other
stylized economies where the nancial sector is a relevant source of shocks.
In general terms, if the central authority wishes to implement a second pol-
icy instrument, ideally, it should satisfy the following characteristics: i) an
e¤ective ability to inuence the channel through which nancial frictions af-
fect macroeconomic variables and ii) it should respond to a variable which
accurately captures the state of the nancial sector. By satisfying these re-
quirements in designing macroprudential policy tools central banks will be
able to a¤ect business cycle dynamics in a positive way. Specically, the
24
implementation of a simple policy rule in these terms allows the second in-
strument to complement a traditional Taylor rule by inuencing nancial
variables. This complementarity requires that macroprudential responses
to nancial sector distress do not o¤set traditional monetary policy at the
macroeconomic level. Rather, a well designed macroprudential policy tool
should reinforce the stabilizing e¤ect of monetary policy over output and
ination by isolating macroeconomic variables from nancial sector shocks
and reducing volatility in this sector.
As evidenced by the recent nancial crisis, models used for policy analysis
must incorporate nancial sector variables in such a way as to contemplate
the macroeconomic e¤ects of shocks in this sector. Here we have done so
while at the same time capturing feedback e¤ects between these two sectors.
Still, robustness checks about these results need to be done for economies in
which there is more evidence in favor of credit volume or credit standards
driving economic activity. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that
although the exercises presented may be a guideline for setting a system wide
capital adequacy ratio, our methodology is silent regarding required capital
adjustments across banking institutions. Further research in this direction is
needed to complement the present analysis.
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Appendix
A Estimation of the Model
Here we present the estimation for the variables of the nancial block. Given
the possible correlation among the three sectors considered, we have em-
ployed a better suited method that allow us to use this information to obtain
better estimators. That way, we have estimated the three lending spreads
equations (3), the delinquency ratio equations (4) and the credit gap equa-
tions (5) using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). Results from the SUR
on Lending Spreads are presented in Table A. All data was found to be sta-
tionary according to the usual set of tests used for this purpose.
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Table A: SUR Lending Spreads
Non-nancial corporations
spreadcorpt = 
corp
0 + 
corp
1 spread
corp
t 1 + 
corp
2 delin
corp
t + 
corp
3 CARt + "spreadj ;t
Coef t-stat p-value
corp0 -9.7568 -4.9893 0.0000
corp1 0.6932 10.4009 0.0000
corp2 0.1521 5.2417 0.0000
corp3 0.6455 5.2842 0.0000
R  squared 0.8624 Adj: R  squared 0.8459
Consumption
spreadconst = 
cons
0 + 
cons
1 spread
cons
t 1 + 
cons
2 delin
cons
t + 
cons
3 CARt + "spreadj ;t
Coef t-stat p-value
cons0 18.7293 3.9687 0.0000
cons1 0.1584 1.0595 0.2927
cons2 0.2115 4.5330 0.0000
cons3 -0.0769 -0.3056 0.7607
R  squared 0.7998 Adj: R  squared 0.7757
Mortgage
spreadmortt = 
mort
0 + 
mort
1 spread
mort
t 1 + 
mort
2 delin
mort
t + 
mort
3 CARt + "spreadj ;t
Coef t-stat p-value
mort0 -8.9867 -4.6882 0.0000
mort1 0.6695 11.2574 0.0000
mort2 0.1605 5.8436 0.0000
mort3 0.6244 5.2177 0.0000
R  squared 0.8411 Adj: R  squared 0.8220
Residual Covariance Matrix
"spreadcorp "spreadcons "spreadmort
"spreadcorp 0.3145 0.2570 0.2940
"spreadcons 0.2570 0.6551 0.3106
"spreadmort 0.2940 0.3106 0.3821
On table B the results from the SUR on Delinquency Indexes are pre-
sented. An important remark should be done; for this estimation we have
calibrated the coe¢ cients of the output gap on the three delinquency indexes
as to match the correlation between each sector and the output gap found in
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the data. Furthermore, for estimation purposes, in case of the consumption
delinquency index we have estimated a coe¢ cient for a trend in time as data
shows a clear trend in the estimated period.
Table B: SUR Delinquency Indexes
Non-nancial corporations
delincorpt = '
corp
0 + '
corp
1 delin
corp
t 1 + '
corp
2 xt + "delincorp;t
Coef t-stat p-value
'corp0 0.9933 1.8957 0.0616
'corp1 0.7542 10.5646 0.0000
'corp2 -0.8013
[ - -
R  squared 0.6673 Adj: R  squared 0.6550
Consumption
delinconst = '
cons
0 + '
cons
1 delin
cons
t 1 + '
cons
2 xt + '
cons
3 trend+ "delincons;t
Coef t-stat p-value
'cons0 -9.2659 -6.4382 0.0000
'cons1 0.6518 12.0096 0.0000
'cons2 -0.2413
[ - -
'cons3 0.3105 6.9364 0.0000
R  squared 0.9870 Adj: R  squared 0.9860
Mortgage
delinmortt = '
mort
0 + '
mort
1 delin
mort
t 1 + '
mort
2 xt + "delinmort;t
Coef t-stat p-value
'mort0 1.8144 3.4765 0.0008
'mort1 0.6834 10.4434 0.0000
'mort2 -0.6811
[ - -
R  squared 0.6746 Adj: R  squared 0.6626
[The coe¢ cients multiplying the output gap were calibrated as to match
the correlation found on the historical data.
Residual Covariance Matrix
"delincons "delincorp "delinmort
"delincons 0.401 0.0665 0.0277
"delincorp 0.0665 0.2553 0.0349
"delintmort 0.0277 0.0349 0.0842
On Table C the SUR estimators for the Credit Gap equations are pre-
sented. We should notice that all signs are the ones expected from theory and
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that the cycle does plays a major part in the behavior of credit, even when
as previously noticed for the Mexican economy the interaction the other way
around does not hold.
Table C: SUR Credit Gap
Non-nancial corporations
crcorpt = 
corp
0 + 1cr
corp
t 1 + 
corp
2 spread
corp
t + 
corp
3 xt + "creditcorp;t
Coef t-stat p-value
corp0 1.9251 1.6166 0.1097
corp1 0.8124 11.4760 0.0000
corp2 -0.8543 -2.2778 0.0253
corp3 0.3819 2.0481 0.0437
R  squared 0.8441 Adj: R  squared 0.8274
Consumption
crconst = 
cons
0 + 1cr
cons
t 1 + 
cons
2 spread
cons
t + 
cons
3 xt + "creditcons;t
Coef t-stat p-value
cons0 13.9016 3.2358 0.0017
cons1 0.8481 10.5990 0.0000
cons2 -0.6399 -3.4352 0.0009
cons3 0.9489 3.0698 0.0029
R  squared 0.9511 Adj: R  squared 0.9459
Mortgage
crmortt = 
mort
0 + 1cr
mort
t 1 + 
mort
2 spread
mort
t + 
mort
3 xt + "creditmort;t
Coef t-stat p-value
mort0 2.0735 1.4356 0.1548
mort1 0.8615 19.1549 0.0000
mort2 -0.6449 -2.1344 0.0357
mort3 0.5638 3.2274 0.0018
R  squared 0.9302 Adj: R  squared 0.9227
Residual Covariance Matrix
"creditcorp "creditcons "creditmort
"creditcorp 6.0336 -0.5301 -2.5992
"creditcons -0.5301 7.6862 1.6557
"creditmort -2.5992 1.6557 7.3865
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Finally, for the specication of the baseline capital adequacy ratio equa-
tion, that is when it is exogenous to the central bank, we estimate equation
(9) by an OLS regression.
OLS Capital Adequacy Ratio
CARt = 0 + 1CARt 1 + "CAR;t
Coef t-stat p-value
0 1.7193 0.9493 0.3498
1 0.8952 7.6705 0.0000
R  squared 0.6549 Adj:R  squared 0.6438
Finally, in order to calibrate the parameter b6 from equation (2), we
matched the response of the output gap to a one percent increase in the
capital adequacy ratio so as to lie within the lowest decile of the distribution
across models of the Macroeconomic-Assessment-Group (2010b). We do this
for the eight year implementation period and the resulting estimated para-
meter is b6 =-0.1367.35 Although admittedly arbitrary, we believe that such
a choice is reasonable due to the lack of development of the Mexican nancial
system as compared to other economies that were also studied.
B Optimal Rules à la Söderlind
In this section we calculate optimal rules following Soderlind (1999). This
methodology has the advantage that one does not need to specify the form of
the optimal instrument(s). Indeed, the optimal instrument(s) is a function
of all the variables of the state-vector of the model.
We calculate optimal rules for two cases:36 1) the only instrument is the
interest rate, and 2) both, the interest rate and the capital adequacy ratio are
instruments. We specify the loss function as in expression (13) and calibrated
the parameter ; which penalizes changes in the capital adequacy ratio to
12.5. This was in order to closely match the variance of the capital adequacy
ratio when the authority has two instruments available to the one observed
in the data.37
Table D shows the results. First, notice that two instruments perform
better than a single one. Most of the gains are attained through a reduction
in the ination gap rather than the output gap. It is important to highlight
that when the capital adequacy ratio is an instrument the correlation of this
35The calibration based on the four year implementation period delivers similar results.
36The optimization was done using the discretion routine using a discount factor of 0.99.
37Notice that this variance is equal to 1.02.
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variable with the output gap remains close to zero so dynamic provisioning
does not arise optimally in this model. Finally, it is important to observe
that the correlation of the interest rate with the capital ratio becomes about
three times more negative when the latter variable is an instrument. This
suggest that these two instruments, to some extent, o¤set each other.
C A Sketch of the Core Model
In this appendix, we replicate the functional forms of Sidaoui and Ramos-
Francia (2008).
ct = a1
c
t 1 + a2Et[
c
t+1] + a3xt + a4(et + 
us
t ) + "c;t
xt = b1xt 1 + b2Et[xt+1] + b3rt 1 + b4xust + b5 ln(rert) + "x;t
rert = c0rert 1 + c1(Et[rert+1] + (rust   rt)) + erer;t
t = !c
c
t + !nc
nc
t
where ct is the core ination, xt is the output gap, et is the nominal
exchange rate, ust is the headline ination in the the United States, rt is the
real interest rate rate, xust is the output gap the the United States, rert is
the real exchange rate, rust is the real interest rate in the United States and
nct is the non-core ination. Finally, the model is closed with a Taylor rule
as in expression (1).
D Additional Results
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